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  1 
INTERNATIONAL WATER RIGHTS ON THE 
WHITE NILE OF THE NEW STATE OF 
SOUTH SUDAN 
ANDREAS K. WENDL* 
Abstract: The birth of South Sudan falls directly in the demarcation zone of 
the rivalry between downstream and upstream riparian states on the waters of 
the Nile River. The downstream states—Egypt and Sudan—stress their “natu-
ral and historic” rights to the entire flow of the Nile based on the 1959 Nile 
Agreement and older colonial treaties, while the upstream African states re-
fuse to be bound by colonial treaties and claim their equitable share of the 
Nile River by promoting South Sudan’s accession to the Cooperative Frame-
work Agreement (CFA). The Nile River Basin lacks an international binding 
water agreement that includes and satisfies all the riparian states. This Article 
analyzes the status quo of South Sudan’s water rights to the Nile River by ad-
dressing the following questions: Is the new state bound by any rights and ob-
ligations established by the 1959 Nile Agreement? Is it advantageous for 
South Sudan to accede to the CFA, which provides for modern principles of 
international water law? The Article applies the customary international law 
of state succession to South Sudan’s secession from Sudan to determine if the 
1959 Nile Agreement is binding between the two states. It concludes that 
South Sudan succeeded Sudan with regard to territorial rights and obligations 
established by the 1959 Nile Agreement, as customary international law rec-
ognizes that legal obligations of a territorial nature remain unaffected by state 
succession. South Sudan should enter into negotiations on a binding water 
agreement to allocate the 18.5 billion cubic meters of water granted to it under 
the 1959 Nile Agreement. The Article concludes that South Sudan should ac-
cede to the CFA within its allotted portion of the Nile waters under the 1959 
Nile Agreement. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Nile River Basin expands from the rainforest of Lake Victoria 
over the wet highlands of Ethiopia to the deserts of Sudan and Egypt until it 
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empties its waters into the Mediterranean Sea.1 The roughly 300 million 
inhabitants of the riparian states—the states situated on the banks of the 
Nile River—claim the Nile waters as their own.2 Since the 19th century, 
these inhabitants have disputed the allotment of the ancient Nile River.3 In 
fact, the river still lacks an international binding water agreement that in-
cludes and satisfies all the riparian states. 4 Consequently, every riparian 
state has undertaken the unilateral effort to use as much water as possible.5 
South Sudan is the eleventh riparian state to the Nile River claiming its 
share of the river’s flow.6 
Hydro-politics within the Nile Basin can be characterized by a strong 
rivalry between downstream—predominantly Arab countries—and upper 
riparian states—the East-African and equatorial lake states. Despite Egypt’s 
and Sudan’s disadvantageous location as downstream states of the Nile Riv-
er, they have benefitted from an established colonial treaty setup, namely 
the 1929 Nile Agreement between Britain, on behalf of its colonies, and 
Egypt and the 1959 Nile Agreement between Sudan and Egypt, which in-
corporated the main provisions of the 1929 Nile Agreement.7 The treaties 
essentially grant most of the Nile’s water to Egypt and a much smaller share 
to Sudan.8 Accordingly, Egypt has often stated that its right to control the 
Nile is based on “international law.”9 Most of the upstream riparian states, 
however, find it extremely difficult to identify international law validating 
Egypt’s claim. Upon their independence, several East African states persis-
tently refused to be bound by these treaties, which they had been forced into 
under colonial rule.10 Moreover, they were and are still not party to the 1959 
Nile Agreement.11 Egypt, however, continues to insist on the validity of the 
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colonial treaties and threatens—sometimes implicitly and sometimes ex-
plicitly—to use force against water projects of riparian states.12 
On July 9, 2011, the new state of South Sudan was born after an inter-
nationally recognized referendum was held, in which almost 99% of South 
Sudanese voted for secession from Sudan.13 South Sudan falls geograph-
ically and politically directly in the demarcation zone of the rivalry between 
the downstream and upstream states. South Sudanese feel a strong link to 
their African neighbors from the equatorial lakes, but are historically bound 
to Sudan and Egypt.14 
In 1999, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was launched by all riparian 
states to create a forum to foster cooperation and to frame an agreement for 
the equitable use and development of the Nile’s resources.15 In 2010, the 
NBI presented its Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), which has 
been signed by six upstream states: Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Kenya, and Burundi.16 The CFA’s forty-five articles incorporate the princi-
ples of equitable water use by all riparian states and no-harm rules to other 
riparian states.17 The CFA aims to finally supplement the unbalanced colo-
nial treaties of the 20th century with modern principles of international wa-
ter law.18 Nevertheless, the CFA has not entered into force because it lacks 
sufficient ratifications.19 The CFA treaty offers a chance to manage the Nile 
coherently for the future. 
The Nile River Basin faces many challenges that call for a common 
approach. Demographic projections forecast that the population living at the 
Nile will double to 600 million people within the next twenty-five years.20 
A higher per-capita use may lead to water shortages as water demand could 
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exceed supply, especially in dry seasons.21 Moreover, the effects of climate 
change in the Nile Basin could lead to less rainfall and more extreme 
weather phenomena overall.22 
Given this situation, South Sudan’s decision regarding whether to ac-
cede to the CFA is of particular significance for the entire Nile Basin. It 
could trigger new dynamics in the ratification process of the CFA and be a 
wake-up call for negotiations for a comprehensive agreement to overcome 
the colonial treaty regime in order to include all Nile riparian states. Egypt 
and Sudan, however, oppose the CFA, consider South Sudan to be bound by 
the 1959 Nile Agreement, and have tried to persuade South Sudan not to 
accede to the CFA.23 
Although there have been several signals by South Sudanese officials 
that they are willing to accede to the CFA, South Sudan has so far been hes-
itant to sign the treaty. 24 International water issues are currently not on 
South Sudan’s political agenda, as it is engaged in a brutal and destructive 
civil war.25 Sooner or later, however, the government of South Sudan will 
have to decide if it wants to accede to the CFA. 
This Article analyzes the status of South Sudan’s water rights to the 
Nile River and addresses the following questions: Is it bound by the 1959 
Nile Agreement? Is it advantageous for South Sudan to accede to the CFA? 
Is the 1959 Nile Agreement a factual obstacle to South Sudan’s accession? 
In the next three sections, this Article frames the situation by describing the 
law of state succession, which evaluates the current status of South Sudan’s 
water rights. The Article first presents an overview on the hydrology of 
South Sudan and the Nile River Basin. Then it briefly introduces the Com-
prehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which eventually led to South Sudan’s 
independence from Sudan without addressing future water allocations be-
tween the two states in any form. The Article then gives a short historical 
outline on colonial water treaties governing the Nile prior to the 1959 Nile 
Agreement and introduces the relevant rights and obligations of the Agree-
ment for South Sudan. 
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The remaining sections provide an outlook on how South Sudan could 
execute its inherited rights and strategies going forward. The Article applies 
the customary international law of state succession to South Sudan’s seces-
sion from Sudan to determine if the 1959 Nile Agreement is binding be-
tween the two states. This section first identifies the two governing provi-
sions of state succession in the applicable case of secession—the principle 
of automatic state succession (Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention) 
and the automatic succession to territorial rights and obligations established 
by treaties (Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention). It then thoroughly 
scrutinizes their status as customary law. This section then argues that South 
Sudan succeeded Sudan with regard to territorial rights and obligations es-
tablished by the 1959 Nile Agreement because customary international law 
recognizes that legal obligations of a territorial nature remain unaffected by 
state succession. South Sudan did not automatically become party to the 
entire 1959 Nile Agreement, as Article 34 is not part of customary interna-
tional law, even though the provisions of the water allocation between Su-
dan and Egypt are binding upon South Sudan. 
The Article next deals with the procedural implications for South Su-
dan and elaborates upon what steps South Sudan must undertake to exercise 
its rights and obligations in the future. South Sudan has the right to use a 
certain share of the waters allocated to Sudan under the 1959 Nile Agree-
ment. The Article then lays out the principles of customary international 
water law for fruitful negotiations between the two Sudans for a binding 
water agreement with respect to the rights and obligations of the 1959 Nile 
Agreement. Finally, the Article presents an overview of contingent issues of 
the negotiation process of the CFA between the riparian states and suggests 
that South Sudan should accede to the CFA within its allotted portion of the 
Nile waters. 
I. SOUTH SUDAN AND THE HYDROLOGY OF THE NILE BASIN 
The Nile is the longest river in the world, flowing 6650 kilometers 
from East Africa to the Mediterranean Sea.26 The watershed bypasses elev-
en riparian states.27 In Khartoum, Sudan, the Nile’s two main tributaries 
merge—the White Nile constantly traveling from the Equatorial Lakes and 
the Blue Nile from Ethiopia’s and Eritrea’s rainy highlands.28 In Barbar, 
north of Khartoum, the last tributary, the Atbarah River, flows into the 
Nile.29 
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About 20% of the Nile Basin belongs to South Sudan and over 90% of 
the territory of South Sudan is part of the Nile Basin.30 The White Nile en-
ters South Sudan at the city of Nimule and runs through its capital city, Ju-
ba, to spread out in the vast swamp area of Al-Sudd.31 The name Al-Sudd 
originates from the Arab word for “barrier” and constitutes one of the larg-
est wetland biospheres in the world.32 Its size varies between 30,000 and 
40,000 square kilometers and it expands to double that size during the wet 
season.33 At this point, the White Nile branches into several smaller rivers 
and is fed later by numerous rivers flowing from the west (mainly the Al-
Arab and Jur Rivers).34 At the city of Malakal, the White Nile is joined by 
its last major tributary, the Sobat River, which originates in Ethiopia. 35 
Traveling further north, the White Nile enters Sudan to merge with the Blue 
Nile into the Nile River.36 In other words, “South Sudan is where the White 
Nile loses and later consolidates itself.”37 
The average water flow of the Nile can be expressed in numbers. At 
the Aswan Dam, the total flow of the Nile is 84.1 billion cubic meters 
(bcm).38 The Blue Nile and the Atbarah River (11 bcm) together contribute 
about 61 bcm, or 72%, of the total flow.39 The White Nile and the Sobat 
River each add about 11.5 bcm of water flow and thus provide the remain-
ing 28% of the total flow measured at the Aswan Dam.40 The contribution 
from the Equatorial Lakes is only 11.5 bcm or 14% of the total flow, but it 
remains steady throughout the year and thus provides for a continuous sup-
ply for the Nile Basin.41 This constant flow is very important because the 
waters of the Blue Nile are highly dependent upon the seasonal rains in 
Ethiopia’s highlands, which feed the Nile with 86% of its waters.42 The two 
water systems complement each other and provide for the water needs of 
Egypt and Sudan during the low-flow period of the Blue Nile.43 
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Egypt and Sudan rely almost completely on Nile waters for irrigation 
purposes.44 On the contrary, most parts of South Sudan have a rainy season 
from June to October and therefore have an additional source for irriga-
tion.45 Egypt and Sudan have a common interest to increase the water sup-
plies arriving from the White Nile in order to be less dependent upon sea-
sonal water flow variations from the Blue Nile.46 Egypt is currently pushing 
for the realization of water conservation projects in the Al-Sudd swamp ar-
ea. 47  Between 1899 and 1903, the British engineer Sir William Garstin 
made three journeys to the Upper Nile, where he perceptively observed that 
nearly 60% of the water entering the Al-Sudd was lost by evaporation and 
transpiration. 48  His report fostered the idea for the construction of the 
Jonglei canal through the wetlands to conserve up to 20 bcm for the White 
Nile, which would almost double the White Nile’s flow.49 The project was 
finally undertaken in a joint effort between Egypt and Sudan in the 1970s, 
but faced major opposition by Southern Sudanese fearing the destruction of 
the wetland ecosystem, which serves as the region’s fishery, drinking water, 
and pasture supply.50 Between 1983 and 1984, with more than two-thirds of 
the 360 kilometers of canal already completed, rebels of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) attacked the construction site several times, 
which brought the project to its end.51 South Sudan has great potential to 
develop water conservation projects in the Al-Sudd, but it should be mind-
ful to preserve the unique ecosystem of the wetland, which is protected un-
der the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and is of great value for the liveli-
hood of the local population.52 
II. SOUTH SUDAN’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE—NO ROOM FOR A 
BINDING WATER AGREEMENT WITH SUDAN 
Surprisingly, Sudan and South Sudan did not incorporate into the CPA  
a treaty on the allocation of the Nile waters, despite both states’ significant 
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dependence upon the Nile as a prime water resource.53 One has to consider 
the circumstances of South Sudan’s independence to comprehend this aston-
ishing fact. 
South Sudan has come a long and violent way to its independence 
from Sudan on July 9, 2011.54 From 1955 until 2005, over two million 
Southern Sudanese were killed in armed conflicts, and approximately four 
million Southern Sudanese fled the South to Sudan or neighboring countries 
during the civil wars.55 Similarly, hundreds of thousands of northern Suda-
nese died on the other side during the longest-running conflict in Africa in 
recorded history.56 One of the central sources of conflict was the dispute 
over water in the civil war from 1983 until 2005—the conflict over the 
Jonglei project and the Abyei region.57 The Abyei conflict relates to a bor-
der demarcation dispute along the Al-Arab River and to water and cattle 
grazing rights in the region.58 
On January 9, 2005, the SPLM and the central government of Sudan 
signed the CPA, ending the civil war and installing an interim constitution 
for Sudan.59 The CPA consisted of six different agreements, signed by the 
conflict parties in Kenya, and a chapeau, which describes the long and 
complicated negotiations and emphasizes the need for a long-lasting 
peace.60 The Machakos Protocol of 2002 was part of the CPA and provided 
for South Sudan’s right to self-determination for the first time.61 According-
ly, South Sudan was allowed to hold a referendum on its independence from 
Sudan six years after the CPA was signed.62 On January 9, 2011, 98.8% of 
the people of South Sudan voted in an internationally recognized referen-
dum for independence from Sudan.63 Six months later, on July 9, 2011, the 
54th African state was officially born.64 
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Despite the centrality of the Nile waters, the agreements did not refer 
to the allocation of water between Sudan and South Sudan or to any coloni-
al Nile treaties with Egypt. The CPA did not incorporate any provisions on 
the allocation of the Nile waters in the Agreement on Wealth Sharing, which 
allocated more than 50% of Sudan’s oil reserves to South Sudan, or in the 
Power Sharing Agreement.65 The latter agreement granted the central gov-
ernment of Sudan the exclusive responsibility for administering the use of 
the Nile resources in the interim phase.66 This right terminated upon South 
Sudan’s independence. As a matter of course, the parties knew about the 
importance of the issue, but preferred to leave it aside for the negotiations 
of the CPA.67 The SPLM was hesitant to demand a share of the Nile waters 
under the 1959 Nile Agreement.68 Such a claim would have injected the 
SPLM in the middle of the Nile controversies between upstream and down-
stream states. The SPLM knew that it needed the support of its neighboring 
states upon South Sudan’s independence.69 Therefore, the SPLM postponed 
its claims on water shares for the era after independence and agreed to 
mandate the waters of the Nile by the central government of Sudan.70 The 
parties thought to come to a solution during the interim phase, before South 
Sudan became independent from Sudan, but these negotiations have not yet 
taken place. 
III. THE 1959 NILE AGREEMENT 
The 1959 Nile Agreement was established as a bilateral treaty between 
Egypt and Sudan and continues to govern water allocation between the two 
states. 71 On the one hand, it grants water rights to Sudan, which might also 
be applicable to South Sudan.72 On the other hand, the treaty solidified the 
dissatisfaction of the other upper riparian states, which strongly reject the 
agreement as a continuation of colonial treaty policy.73 
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A. History of the 1959 Nile Agreement 
Many treaties have been concluded to regulate the utilization of the 
waters of the Nile River over the last two centuries.74 Most of the early co-
lonial treaties were of a bilateral nature, dividing the waters of the Nile be-
tween Britain and other European states according to their interests.75 At the 
beginning of the 20th century, Egypt was included in the British Nile 
Agreements. 76 Nevertheless, these agreements caused bitter conflicts be-
tween the riparian states.77 The Nile Agreements from 192978 and 195979 
have continued the tradition of inequitable allocation. The 1929 Nile 
Agreement is a great reflection of the predominant power relations of that 
time and became “the dominating feature of legal relationships concerning 
the distribution and utilization of the Nile waters,”80 which Egypt claims are 
still in effect today. 
The British framers of the Nile Agreements gave special attention to 
secure free passage through the Suez Canal, the shortest sea route between 
Europe and British-ruled India.81 Thus, they drafted remarkably favorable 
treaty provisions to please Egypt.82 British colonial power then expanded 
outside Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo83 to the major ri-
parian states of the Nile (Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), and Britain 
willingly ratified the 1929 Nile Agreement on their behalf.84 The 1929 Nile 
Agreement provided Sudan with only four bcm of water allotment, but did 
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not take any irrigation or developmental needs of the remaining upper ripar-
ian states into account.85 On the contrary, Egypt was granted the remaining 
share of 48 bcm of water, according to scientific assessment, for its own 
purposes.86 Egypt received ownership of any remaining water as it reached 
Egypt and was granted a veto right binding upon all riparian states to ob-
struct any upstream water projects that would reduce the quantity of water 
arriving in Egypt, modify the timing of the water’s arrival, or lower its lev-
el.87 The 1929 Nile Agreement also expressed Britain’s view of the “natural 
and historic rights of Egypt in the waters of the Nile”—without any expla-
nation of the origin and content of these rights.88 
In Sudan, resentment against the 1929 Nile Agreement arose soon after 
its conclusion, even before Sudan’s independence. British administrators in 
Sudan identified the 1929 Nile Agreement as a major obstacle to economic 
and social development within the state, and Sudanese interest groups re-
jected the agreement, which had been directly concluded between London 
and Cairo, and stressed that they were not party to it.89 Thus, after attaining 
independence in 1956, Sudan further underlined the invalidity of the 1929 
Nile Agreement.90 Egypt felt compelled to renegotiate a new treaty with 
Sudan, which resulted in the 1959 Nile Agreement.91 Officially, the reason 
for undertaking negotiations between the two states was the extension of the 
only partial utilization of the Nile waters of 1929 to the full utilization, 
which provided Egypt with full control of the Nile waters.92 Unlike the 
1929 Nile Agreement, in which Britain effectively bound its East-African 
riparian colonies, the 1959 Nile Agreement was merely a bilateral treaty, 
with the consequence that all provisions of the 1929 Nile Agreement that 
were not explicitly revoked or repudiated remained in effect.93 The 1959 
agreement maintains the principle of respecting established rights by prior 
Nile Agreements, including the 1929 Nile Agreement.94 Thus, the 1959 Nile 
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Agreement did not replace its predecessor entirely, and British riparian col-
onies continued to be bound by the 1929 Nile Agreement.95 
B. Relevant Rights and Obligations Under the 1959 Nile Agreement 
The 1959 Nile Agreement created a set of rights and obligations be-
tween Sudan and Egypt related to the construction of the Aswan Dam and 
other water projects located in Sudan and in today’s South Sudan.96 The 
agreement does not contain any provisions on water quality, but focuses 
mainly on water allocation.97 For this Article, there are three main provi-
sions of interest, each of which is binding upon Sudan and might be appli-
cable to South Sudan.98 
First, the entire waters of the Nile flow were shared between Egypt and 
Sudan.99 Since the 1929 Nile Agreement, the average flow of the river at the 
Aswan Dam was considered to be 84 bcm.100 Seepage and evaporation are 
estimated to account for 10 bcm, leaving 74 bcm to be divided.101 Of this 
total, the acquired rights of Egypt and Sudan were given precedence and 
amounted to 52 bcm.102 The remaining benefits of approximately 22 bcm 
were divided by a ratio of 7.5 bcm for Egypt and 14.5 bcm for Sudan.103 
Egypt was allotted the flow of 55.5 bcm of water and Sudan received 18.5 
bcm for its use.104 
Second, the agreement contains a provision that the Sudanese govern-
ment, in cooperation with Egypt, will undertake projects to increase the 
Nile waters by preventing water waste in the great swamp region of the 
White Nile, located in the territory of today’s South Sudan.105 Net revenues 
from those projects shall accrue in equal shares to both states, which will 
also equally share the costs. 106 With the other’s cooperation, Sudan and 
Egypt were granted the right to construct water conservation projects in 
their respective territories.107 
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Lastly, a Joint Technical Commission was established to enhance 
knowledge sharing and to determine new water allocations between Egypt 
and Sudan in the event of water shortages.108 Both states were aware that, in 
the future, the upper riparian states might increase their use of the Nile for 
their development. 109  In case such negotiations on water apportionment 
with third states were required, Egypt and Sudan agreed beforehand to take 
a “unified view.” 110  This commission was also required to determine 
whether water projects on the Nile beyond the borders of Egypt and Sudan 
were permissible or negatively affected the flow of the Nile.111 
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 
The international law of state succession needs to be consulted to un-
derstand which treaties currently bind South Sudan because the CPA and the 
1959 Nile Agreement remain silent on how water should be allocated be-
tween Sudan and South Sudan. As mentioned above, the 1959 Nile Agree-
ment is only a bilateral treaty between Egypt and Sudan, and the CPA be-
tween Sudan and South Sudan does not provide for a devolution treaty,112 
which would outline the rights and obligations between the two Sudans 
with regard to the 1959 Nile Agreement. 
This section first identifies the governing provisions of customary in-
ternational law of state succession and evaluates each provision’s status as a 
customary norm. Then, the international law of state succession is applied 
to determine the rights and obligations between Sudan and South Sudan. 
Finally, this section addresses the question of whether the rights and obliga-
tions of the 1959 Nile Agreement are binding upon South Sudan. 
A. Identification of Governing Provisions of International Law on State 
Succession in the Case of South Sudan 
This section provides a short introduction to the international law of 
state succession according to customary law and the 1978 Vienna Conven-
tion on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978 Vienna Conven-
tion).113  As of today, the law of state succession has not entirely been set-
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tled.114 International treaties bind the concluding states regardless of wheth-
er another government has replaced the signing government.115 These inter-
national treaties, when entered into force, limit to varying degrees the pow-
er of consenting states with respect to the object of the treaty.116 States, 
therefore, limit their own sovereignty to achieve a common goal.117 
Which rules are applicable when a new state is born? Are all treaties of 
the predecessor state binding upon the new state ab initio? The answers 
given by international law and state practice are still in many regards “con-
fused and uncertain,” even though many state successions have occurred 
globally.118 As a result of the often very political and emotional circum-
stances of state succession, state practice is highly variable and strongly 
based on national policy considerations, rather than on general normative 
principles of international law.119 
Today’s rules of state succession derive mainly from customary inter-
national law and the codification of the 1978 Vienna Convention. Article 
2(b) of the 1978 Vienna Convention defines succession as “the replacement 
of one State by another in the responsibility for the international relations of 
the territory.”120 The term signifies “a change of sovereignty” over a certain 
territory, in which the “new sovereign [succeeds] to the legal rights and ob-
ligations of the old sovereign.”121 Certainly, South Sudan succeeded Sudan 
in its responsibility for international relations for its territory upon its inde-
pendence in 2011. 
These definitions are broadly accepted as they guarantee a smooth and 
clear transition. The new state shall inherit all the rights and obligations of 
the international treaties of its predecessor.122 Those rules provide stability 
and continuity in established treaty relations for the global community.123 
The clear disadvantage of that principle of “universal continuity” is the in-
herent limitation of the new state’s sovereignty.124 From the beginning, eve-
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ry new state’s government would suffer from a limitation of discretionary 
powers concerning its foreign relations, without taking the circumstances of 
its emergence and the type of agreement into consideration.125 Therefore, 
international law and state practices vary according to different settings of 
emergence and draw different legal conclusions as to whether rights and 
obligations are inherited ab initio or not. Moreover, differing types and con-
tents of treaties have different effects on the transition of rights and obliga-
tions.126 
The 1978 Vienna Convention is a practicable starting point for the as-
sessment of applicable provisions in the case of state secession or separa-
tion.127 The governing provisions of state succession in the case of South 
Sudan are Article 34 and Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. On the 
one hand, Article 34 foresees that the successor state will inherit all treaties 
automatically from its predecessor upon independence if the territory con-
sists only of parts of the predecessor state’s former territory.128 Therefore, 
the concept of Article 34 seems prima facie applicable in South Sudan’s 
case of state secession. On the other hand, according to the theory of auto-
matic territorial treaties as provided in Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Con-
vention, South Sudan could be automatically bound with regard to the terri-
torial rights and obligations established by the 1959 Nile Agreement.129  
The 1978 Vienna Convention, however, is not applicable between Su-
dan and South Sudan. Sudan only signed but never ratified the 1978 Vienna 
Convention.130 Egypt signed and ratified the Convention.131 South Sudan 
neither signed nor ratified it.132 According to the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties of 1969, every signatory is obliged not to defeat the object 
of the treaty prior to its entry into force.133 In the context of state succes-
sion, this concept is hardly applicable because Sudan lost its sovereignty 
over South Sudan, and it is virtually impossible to enforce that obligation 
on South Sudan. Therefore, in the case of South Sudan, the rules of state 
succession established by international agreements are not applicable. 
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B. Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention in the Case of State Secession 
Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention governs the law of state 
succession when a state separates into two or more states.134 First, this part 
examines if Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention is applicable to the 
case of South Sudan. Then, it turns to the question of whether Article 34 is 
regarded as customary international law or if there is a different governing 
principle accepted as custom in cases of state secession. 
1. Scope of Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention 
The 1978 Vienna Convention basically foresees two different scenarios 
for state succession: the “clean slate” state applies for “newly independent 
states,” and “universal continuity” applies for most other types of new state 
emergences, including cases in which one state separates from another state 
or two or more states unify into one state, unless states agree otherwise.135 
According to Article 2(f) of the 1978 Vienna Convention, a “newly in-
dependent state” is born when its territory was immediately dependent on a 
different state before the date of succession.136 The Convention adopted the 
“clean slate” state or tabula rasa based on the recent experiences of decolo-
nization, mainly in Africa and South America.137 It was conceived to be just 
that those successor states should be perceived as wholly new legal person-
alities with a clean slate.138 These states should not be bound ab initio by 
any treaties from their colonial era, except for treaties that determine bor-
ders to prevent future disputes with neighboring countries as provided by 
Article 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention.139 
On the other hand, Article 34(1) of the 1978 Vienna Convention gov-
erns the case of state separation and its effect on treaties.140 It declares that 
any treaty that was in force at the date of the succession of states with re-
spect to the entire territory of the predecessor state continues to be in force 
with each successor state so formed.141 The entire territory of South Sudan 
is identical to former parts of the territory of Sudan. Consequently, this 
would lead to universal continuity of treaty obligations and, in particular, 
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would indicate that the 1959 Nile Agreement, which bound Sudan at the 
time of state succession, was transferred to South Sudan.142 
The 1978 Vienna Convention creates a certain contradiction by sepa-
rating the world into mainly two categories: states with colonial heritage 
and states without colonial heritage.143 Whereas the latter category fully 
succeeds to the rights and obligations of the treaties established by the pre-
decessor, unless the states negotiate otherwise, “newly independent states” 
enjoy full discretion regarding their international obligations as they apply 
the “clean slate” state doctrine.144 
Could the relationship between Sudan and South Sudan possibly be 
described as a “dependency” similar to colonial rule in Africa?145 Although 
the independence of South Sudan was shaped by a struggle for self-
determination, its focus rests on secession from Sudan, as South Sudan con-
sists exclusively of former territory under the sovereignty of Sudan.146  Su-
dan, however, cannot be viewed as a former colonial power suppressing 
South Sudan, as stipulated for newly independent states, nor was Sudan un-
der colonial rule when it signed the 1959 Nile Agreement, which supple-
mented the colonial 1929 Nile Agreement.147 South Sudan merely exercised 
its constitutional right for secession from Sudan, which was created under 
the interim Constitution as part of the CPA.148 Consequently, South Sudan 
cannot be treated as a newly independent state to which the “clean slate” 
state doctrine applies. Instead, Article 34 is the applicable norm for the de-
termination of state succession.149 
2. Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention: Part of Customary 
International Law? 
Whether South Sudan became a successor to the 1959 Nile Agreement 
upon its independence depends upon whether Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna 
Convention, which stipulates automatic succession in cases of state separa-
tion, can be regarded as customary international law or if custom provides 
for a different approach. 
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Customary international law is binding upon all nations; explicit con-
sent of the states to the rules is not required.150 But customary law on state 
succession is particularly vague, and it is often very difficult to distinguish a 
rule from its exception.151 In its judgments of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Pro-
ject in 1997152 and Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia in 1996,153 the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) did not clarify whether it considers Article 34 
of the 1978 Vienna Convention (the principle of universal succession) to be 
part of customary international law.154 
There is broad agreement that the 1978 Vienna Convention did not en-
tirely reflect customary law, but rather codified norms for the progressive 
development of international law. 155  The International Law Commission 
(ILC), in its “Commentary to the Draft Articles on Succession of States in 
Respect of Treaties,” referred to inconsistent state practices regarding Arti-
cle 34, sometimes suggesting automatic succession and sometimes suggest-
ing other consequences.156 The ILC’s legislative effort was to bring those 
practices to a common denominator for the 1978 Vienna Convention be-
cause practices varied widely due to the circumstances of state succession: 
More specifically, the Vienna Convention reflects the customary 
trend to continue treaty rights and obligations, but it does not ac-
curately reflect the divergent practices regarding the question of 
whether treaties automatically continue or whether the successor 
states must consent to their continuation.157  
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The 1978 Vienna Convention fails to take into consideration the divergent 
policies as underlying causes for the respective state practices.158 
Although the 1978 Vienna Convention did not reflect state practice, it 
could have influenced the behavior of various states and therefore evolved 
into customary international law with regard to automatic succession. Some 
multilateral treaties, like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the 
Helsinki Protocol, have established customary international law even 
though they did not have binding effect on the parties.159 The sheer number 
of parties made these treaties globally accepted and shaped state behavior 
and opinio juris after coming into force.160 The 1978 Vienna Convention, 
however, remains far from representing global consent, particularly because 
emerging law and policy give preference to policy-oriented approaches over 
the positivistic approach of the Convention. 161  It took the 1978 Vienna 
Convention over seventeen years to enter into force in 1996, after its open-
ing for signatures in 1979.162 So far, the 1978 Vienna Convention has only 
twenty-two parties and nineteen signatories; neither the United States nor 
any influential Western state has become a party or signatory.163 
Not only states’ reluctance to accede to the 1978 Vienna Convention, 
but also state practices after 1978 signal that automatic succession did not 
become part of international law.164 After the fall of the Iron Curtain, nu-
merous cases of state succession occurred in the territory of the former So-
viet Union and Yugoslavia. 165 Every case was treated differently by the 
states involved with respect to their succession to existing treaties, without 
giving effect to the clear dichotomy of clean slate states for former colonies 
and that of automatic succession for other forms of state succession.166 In 
2008, the International Law Association (ILA) promulgated its report on 
recent international state practice on state succession: 
Recent State practice shows different approaches of the successor 
States with regard to treaties in cases of secession and dissolution. 
Although in their vast majority, successor States considered them-
selves as successor to the multilateral treaties, some of them 
adopted the clean slate rule, rendering that succession merely op-
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tional. Yet other States decided to accede to some multilateral 
treaties to which the predecessor State was a party. In principle, 
Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention was referred to by most 
of the successor States, whereas for some others that Article does 
not reflect customary law.167  
Article 34 of the Convention appears “too rigid” to resemble custom-
ary international law because it does not even require notification, as state 
practice of general succession shows.168 The practice of state continuity to 
the legal personality of the predecessor shows that states provide declara-
tions of continuity.169 Although these unilateral statements do not bind third 
states or states party to the treaties in question,170 “[t]his practice reflects the 
need of legal certainty by affirming the existence of a situation of continuity 
on the one hand, and by the clarification of the consequences thereof.”171 
The successor state has to make a clear statement as to whether it 
wishes to be bound by the treaties of its predecessor.172 In cases of state 
succession, pragmatism is, and was, the prevailing doctrine in customary 
international law.173 State practice illustrates that it did not follow the ap-
proach of the 1978 Vienna Convention.174 Since South Sudan’s independ-
ence, officials have been reluctant to give clear statements on state succes-
sion with respect to international treaties and to the 1959 Nile Agreement.175 
The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
(Restatement)—although it does not generally reflect customary interna-
tional law, but certainly serves as a strong indicator for existing state prac-
tice and opinio juris—supports this finding and further modifies the provi-
sion of state succession in cases like that of South Sudan: 
When part of a state becomes a new state, the new state does not 
succeed to the international agreements to which the predecessor 
state was a party, unless, expressly or by implication, it accepts 
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such agreements and the other party or parties agree thereto or 
acquiesce.176 
In cases like that of South Sudan, customary international law does not 
adopt the clean slate rule because the new state would not be entitled to be-
come a party to the treaties of the predecessor nor succeed ipso jure to exist-
ing treaties, independent of any affirmative action on its part.177 Customary 
international law claims that the treaties of the predecessor state bind none 
of the successor states, regardless of the particular circumstances surround-
ing the break-up of that state (colonial or non-colonial past).178 It therefore 
diverges substantively from Article 34 and clearly rejects the concept of 
automatic succession in cases of state separation. Customary international 
law requires statements by the successor states to clearly determine their 
willingness to be bound by certain treaties of the predecessor, to which the 
parties to the treaties have finally agreed upon.179 In particular, the Re-
statement omits the contentious dichotomy of states with colonial and non-
colonial backgrounds.180 
Without a declaration of its willingness to be bound, South Sudan will 
not become party to the 1959 Nile Agreement. Upon its independence, 
South Sudan “start[ed] afresh, with neither rights nor obligations under the 
agreements of its predecessor state.”181 South Sudan maintains a clean slate 
unless it unilaterally declares its desire to adopt the 1959 Nile Agreement.182 
The Restatement also gives Egypt and Sudan some leverage in the situation, 
as they would have to consent to the accession of South Sudan.183 Moreo-
ver, since South Sudan has come into existence, Egypt could theoretically 
cease its obligations according to the principle of rebus sic stantibus be-
cause major projects of the 1959 Nile Agreement now lie within South Su-
dan’s territory.184 From a legal and strategic point of view, however, it is 
highly doubtful that Egypt could consider invoking this principle. The ICJ 
enshrined a very high threshold to meet the rebus sic stantibus require-
ments, as seen in in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project decision.185 
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South Sudan did not succeed automatically to the 1959 Nile Agree-
ment.186 Nevertheless, South Sudan may accede to the 1959 Nile Agree-
ment, but it needs to state its willingness to do so to the parties of the treaty 
and is dependent upon their acceptance of the treaty. Furthermore, the bilat-
eral nature of the 1959 Nile Agreement requires negotiations between the 
parties and South Sudan for the adoption of the treaty.187 
C. Territorial Treaties According to Article 12 of the 1978  
Vienna Convention 
Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention presents a different ap-
proach to the law of state succession than Article 34, which applies in cases 
of state separation.188 In contrast, Article 12 applies to treaties that have a 
direct effect on the territory of another state.189 The 1959 Nile Agreement 
could fall into this category and be binding on South Sudan from its date of 
independence.190 The following part first examines whether Article 12 is 
customary international law. Then it discusses the scope of succession with 
regard to the rights and obligations of the 1959 Nile Agreement. Finally, 
this part evaluates whether South Sudan could apply the Nyerere doctrine to 
render the territorial rights and obligations insignificant. The finding above 
that South Sudan is not yet bound by the 1959 Nile Agreement will be re-
futed if the agreement falls into the category of treaties that create a territo-
rial regime, therefore leading to automatic succession to that treaty or, at a 
minimum, to the rights and obligations established by that treaty. 
1. Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention: Part of Customary 
International Law? 
Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention enjoys common recognition 
as customary international law and provides that the rights and obligations 
attached to a specific territory and established by a treaty remain unaffected 
by state succession.191 The ICJ ruled in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project that 
“Article 12 reflects a rule of customary international law.”192 
Article 11 foresees that state succession does not affect boundaries es-
tablished by a treaty or rights and obligations established by a treaty that 
relate to a boundary regime.193 It is generally accepted that boundaries re-
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main unaffected by state succession to serve the common purpose of con-
flict prevention.194 Similarly, the rationale of Article 12 is to protect most 
territorial obligations, especially those for the benefit of other states, irre-
spective of the new state’s past.195 Its scope is much broader than Article 11 
and ensures the continuity of those rights and obligations attached to the 
territory. 196  These rights and duties must result from territorial treaties, 
which are often referred to as dispositive treaties.197 
Dispositive agreements are directly related to a certain territory and are 
therefore unaffected by a fundamental change in sovereignty.198 On the con-
trary, political or personal agreements only concern the states’ governments 
as such.199 For example, dispositive treaties establish riparian states’ right of 
passage by way of river navigation.200 Literally, Article 12 can be compared 
to some kind of “international servitudes,” which remain in place when the 
sovereign of the territory changes—just like those rights that remain in pri-
vate law in the case of a transfer of property.201 These servitudes are oppos-
able erga omnes.202 Article 12(1) speaks of territory “for the benefit of any 
territory of a foreign State” and Article 12(2) refers to a territory “for the 
benefit of a group of States;” in both cases, the rights and obligations must 
be attached to the territories in question.203 
The 1959 Nile Agreement provides for such territorial rights and obli-
gations.204 According to the ILC’s comments, such territorial rights and ob-
ligations established by a water treaty are comprised of water rights like 
fishing, the right of navigation, irrigation, and supply of water.205 The 1959 
Nile Agreement consists of various parts governing rights and obligations 
between Egypt and Sudan.206 The centerpiece of the agreement is the provi-
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sion allocating the waters of the Nile between the two parties, which quali-
fies as a territorial obligation.207 The 1959 Nile Agreement incorporates the 
1929 Nile Agreement, which the ILC refers to as a major precedent for a 
dispositive treaty.208 Since then, the entire territory of Sudan, including the 
territory of South Sudan, was charged with the servitude for Egypt’s water 
supply and the right to use as much water as allocated by the treaty.209 
2. Legal Consequence of Article 12: Succession to the Entire Treaty or 
Merely to Territorial Rights and Obligations? 
Although it is broadly accepted that Article 12 is part of customary in-
ternational law, the legal consequence of the provision is disputed. Some 
argue that South Sudan automatically succeeded to the entire 1959 Nile 
Agreement,210 whereas others stress it succeeded merely to those rights and 
obligations related to its territory, as the wording of Article 12 suggests.211 
The ICJ came to the conclusion in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project that 
the entire treaty of the project in question would remain unaffected by state 
succession.212 The primary concern of the case involved the use of an inter-
national river for a joint hydropower project that came to halt.213 Hungary 
maintained that the agreement (1977 Treaty) was solely an investment 
agreement, which is not subject to automatic succession because it does not 
create rights attached to a territory.214 The ICJ, however, concluded that the 
construction and operation of a system of locks, sited in the territory of both 
states, established territorial obligations on the parties.215 The contentious 
treaty between Hungary and Slovakia also contained a clause to ensure “un-
interrupted and safe navigation on the international fairway” of the Danube 
River.216 
The critiques of the ICJ’s decision are twofold. First, criticism derives 
from the ICJ’s vague definition that led to confusion about which water 
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treaties create territorial rights and obligations.217 The finding that Article 
12 should be applicable was flawed because it relies on the ILC’s imprecise 
definition: “Treaties concerning water rights or navigation on rivers are 
commonly regarded as candidates for inclusion in the category of territorial 
treaties.”218 Those findings are directly premised on the comments of the 
ILC to Article 12.219 The ICJ’s recourse to the ILC commentary does not 
resolve the scope of Article 12 and leaves room for alternative interpreta-
tion.220 Hence, one can conclude that the ICJ did not rule that every water 
treaty establishes rights and obligations attached to a territory. 
Second, despite the unambiguous textual premises of Article 12, the 
ICJ concluded that the entire treaty in question remains binding upon the 
successor state to ensure continuity of the treaty regime:221 
 The Court observes that Article 12, in providing only, without 
reference to the treaty itself, that rights and obligations of a terri-
torial character established by a treaty are unaffected by a succes-
sion of States, appears to lend support to the position of Hungary 
rather than of Slovakia. However the Court concludes that this 
formulation was devised rather to take account of the fact that, in 
many cases, treaties which had established boundaries or territo-
rial régimes were no longer in force. . . . Those that remained in 
force would nonetheless bind a successor state. 
 Taking all these factors into account, the Court finds that the 
content of the 1977 Treaty indicates that it must be regarded as 
establishing a territorial régime within the meaning of Article 12 
of the 1978 Vienna Convention. It created rights and obligations 
“attaching to” the parts of the Danube to which it relates; thus the 
Treaty itself cannot be affected by a succession of States.222  
The ICJ stretched the wording of Article 12 and concluded—as indicated by 
the word “thus”—that, because the treaty in question established territorial 
rights and obligations, the entire treaty itself consequently cannot be affect-
ed by a state succession.223 But Article 12 clearly differentiates between 
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established rights and obligations and the treaty itself.224 The latter is not 
meant to be immune from state succession.225 The ICJ’s decision therefore 
leaves some doubt that every provision of a treaty that established certain 
rights and obligations attached to a territory entirely survives state succes-
sion. In the given case, it was argued that the ICJ did not find it necessary to 
differentiate between the 1977 Treaty and the territorial regime it estab-
lished because virtually all provisions had a territorial attachment, which 
made that distinction artificial.226 Hence, the findings of the ICJ are not 
transferable to treaties that include many provisions with a non-territorial 
character. In this regard, the ICJ failed to establish a clear distinction be-
tween those two groups of treaties.227 
Therefore, the territorial obligation has to be proven on a case-by-case 
basis.228 All territorial rights and obligations established by the 1959 Nile 
Agreement, such as the water allocation, have survived South Sudan’s se-
cession from Sudan.229 South Sudan, however, did not automatically be-
come a party to the 1959 Nile Agreement, as it also contains provisions of a 
non-territorial nature.230 
South Sudan needs to enter into negotiations with Egypt and Sudan if 
it wants to change or withdraw from the rights and obligations established 
by the 1959 Nile Agreement.231 The purpose of Article 12 is to prevent 
states from unilaterally invalidating territorial servitudes, like boundary 
agreements, to avoid future disputes.232 Changing or withdrawing from ter-
ritorial rights and obligations is thus solely permissible with the consent of 
the parties involved or, as is sometimes argued, due to a colonial past.233 
3. The Nyerere Doctrine 
The Nyerere doctrine has developed in Tanzania as a modification of 
the clean slate theory.234 It is sometimes advocated that South Sudan could 
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invoke the Nyerere doctrine to refute the territorial rights and obligations 
under the 1959 Nile Agreement.235 
The Nyerere doctrine is named after the first President of Tanzania.236 
For newly independent states, it departs from a “categorical discontinuity of 
treaties” upon their sovereignty and develops an optional doctrine to “selec-
tively consent” to treaties over a period of two years.237 During that grace 
period, all colonial treaties remain in effect, unless revoked or adapted 
through renegotiations with the parties.238 By the time the grace period ex-
pires, all treaties to which the parties did not expressly consent lapse.239 
Noteworthy in this regard is the rejection of the 1929 Nile Agreement 
by Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, which applied the Nyerere doctrine to the 
established territorial regime.240 These precedents do not suggest that the 
1929 Nile Agreement did not establish territorial obligations, but raised the 
question of whether those territorial obligations are refutable if they were 
established by a colonial power.241 Therefore, the Nyerere doctrine alleged-
ly established an exemption from the application of Article 12, although 
Egypt persistently objected to the doctrine and claimed automatic succes-
sion because of the territorial nature of the 1929 Nile Agreement.242 
The Nyerere doctrine, however, is not applicable to the case of South 
Sudan because South Sudan lacks the colonial past with regard to the 1959 
Nile Agreement. Sudan cannot be viewed as a former colonial power sup-
pressing South Sudan, as stipulated for newly independent states, and Sudan 
was not under colonial rule when it signed the 1959 Nile Agreement sup-
plementing the colonial 1929 Nile Agreement.243 Moreover, the two-year 
grace period for statements and negotiations regarding treaties of the prede-
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cessor expired in 2013, consequently resulting in a loss of South Sudan’s 
rights for accession to the 1959 Nile Agreement.244 
4. Scope of the Inherited Territorial Rights and Obligations of the 1959 Nile 
Agreement 
The 1959 Nile Agreement establishes three different territorial rights 
and obligations for South Sudan.245 The scope of inheritance for each right 
has to be evaluated separately on a case-by-case basis. 
First, the provisions of the water allocations of the 1959 Nile Agree-
ment remain binding upon Egypt, Sudan, and South Sudan.246 The water 
allocation provision is a typical example of a territorial right and obliga-
tion.247 Sudan and South Sudan will have to enter into negotiations in good 
faith to allocate their share of 18.5 bcm of water.248 
Second, Article 3 of the 1959 Nile Agreement provided for the con-
struction of water projects, like the Jonglei project, to increase the flow of 
the Nile situated in South Sudan’s territory.249 Thus, the agreement estab-
lished a territorial right for South Sudan, Sudan, and Egypt to undertake 
water conservation projects.250 If Egypt or Sudan wants to proceed with a 
water conservation project on South Sudanese soil, it must reach an agree-
ment with South Sudan.251 The sovereign government of South Sudan has 
full discretion over whether these projects will be realized.252 To this effect, 
Egypt and Sudan may enter into good faith negotiations with South Sudan. 
South Sudan, however, has objected several times to the continuation of the 
Jonglei project—the most prominent project initiated by Egypt under Arti-
cle 3 of the 1959 Nile Agreement—but similar projects could be feasible.253 
Lastly, should South Sudan apply to become a full party to the Joint 
Technical Commission, Sudan and Egypt will very likely grant such a re-
quest.254 So far, South Sudan automatically became party to the Joint Tech-
nical Commission as far as the allocation of water is concerned.255 Like 
other international river basin commissions, the Joint Technical Commis-
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sion has tasks with both territorial and non-territorial character.256 As set out 
in Article 12 of the 1978 Convention, a state automatically becomes party to 
such a commission only with regard to rights or obligations of a territorial 
character.257 In all other cases, the new states have to request to become 
party to multilateral commissions.258 The Joint Technical Commission pro-
vides for planning of water projects for maintenance and enhances the ex-
change of technical know-how between Sudan and Egypt.259 It further de-
termines water projects initiated by all other riparian states outside their 
territory.260 These regulations are not attached to uses of a specific territory 
but rather regulate decision-making processes and rights.261 Nevertheless, 
separating the rights of the Joint Technical Commission seems impractical 
for all states and should be overcome by negotiations in good faith for full 
party status of South Sudan to the Commission.262 
V. PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH SUDAN 
This section clarifies the relationship between Article 12 of the 1978 
Vienna Convention and customary international law with regard to state 
separation, which lead to somewhat contradictory results, and suggests a 
procedural way for South Sudan to execute its rights and obligations under 
international law. If there is indeed a choice for South Sudan in how it exe-
cutes its rights, which procedural path should it choose? 
Currently, South Sudanese officials are still very hesitant to give any 
statements with regard to water allocation issues and to international water 
treaties on the Nile, like the 1959 Nile Agreement and the CFA.263 That hes-
itation could stem from the lack of certainty about South Sudan’s current 
water rights to the Nile. On the one hand, this Article shows that, according 
to Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, South Sudan already has terri-
torial rights and obligations vis-à-vis the 1959 Nile Agreement between Su-
dan and Egypt regarding a share of Sudan’s total water allocation of 18.5 
bcm of water per year, engagement in water conservation projects in its ter-
ritory, and becoming party with certain rights to the Joint Technical Com-
                                                                                                                           
 256 See Leb & Tignino, supra note 124, at 439. 
 257 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 113, art. 12; Helal, supra note 67, at 980. 
 258 See 1978 Vienna Convention, supra note 113, art. 12; Leb & Tignino, supra note 124, at 
439. 
 259 See MCCAFFREY, supra note 4, at 268–69. 
 260 See MEGAHED, supra note 98, at 25–26. 
 261 See Leb & Tignino, supra note 124, at 442. 
 262 See Helal, supra note 67, at 983. The duty to cooperate is one of the leading principles in 
international water law. CHRISTINA LEB, COOPERATION IN THE LAW OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER 
RESOURCES 79–81 (2nd ed. 2013). 
 263 See Salman, Water Resources in the Sudan North-South Peace Process, supra note 24, at 
351–52. 
30 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:1 
mission.264 On the other hand, according to customary international law, 
South Sudan is, as in cases of state secession, not yet bound by the 1959 
Nile Agreement—it is dependent upon a unilateral statement by South Su-
dan assuring its willingness to become party to the treaty and acceptance by 
Egypt and Sudan.265 
Article 12 and customary international law in cases of state secession 
overlap in many ways in both scope and legal consequences. The procedur-
al road is, nevertheless, signposted by the ICJ and pragmatic expecta-
tions.266 In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ gave precedence to the 
customary provision of Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, with re-
spect to territorial rights and obligations, over Article 34, which was not 
applied because the ICJ was reluctant to resolve whether Article 34 resem-
bled custom.267 According to the findings of this Article, however, Article 
34 is not part of customary international law because it lacks clear state 
practice; Article 34 is modified in a way that state succession to certain trea-
ties of the predecessor is applicable if the parties concerned express their 
willingness to be bound by existing treaties of the predecessor. 268  State 
practice shows that all states have a claim for succession, but they need to 
expressly assert their will to be bound to execute the rights and obligations 
under the treaty.269 Moreover, the other treaty parties need to consent to the 
statement of the successor state.270 
From a pragmatic perspective, however, South Sudan has a choice be-
tween two procedural pathways. On the one hand, if South Sudan wants to 
enjoy all the rights and obligations of the 1959 Nile Agreement, South Su-
dan should declare its willingness to be fully bound by the 1959 Nile 
Agreement to Sudan and Egypt. This declaration will consequently lead to 
negotiations and adaptations of the 1959 Nile Agreement because it is a bi-
lateral treaty that needs to be revised so that a third party can fully accede to 
it. These negotiations could also lead to a new agreement that is less ruth-
less with regard to the water rights of the upstream riparian states. Prior to 
this declaration, South Sudan should undertake negotiations in good faith 
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on water allocations between Sudan and South Sudan under the rights es-
tablished by the 1959 Nile Agreement.271 
On the other hand, if South Sudan does not wish to further engage with 
the downstream countries, Egypt and Sudan, it should not express its will-
ingness to be bound by the entire 1959 Nile Agreement. But it has to enter 
into negotiations with Sudan to apportion its water rights under the 1959 
Nile Agreement.272 
Although it is uncertain which procedural approach for South Sudan is 
more favorable, South Sudan should enter into good faith negotiations with 
Sudan on water allocation under the 1959 Nile Agreement. 273 After all, 
South Sudan can confidently claim its share under the agreement.274 
VI. WATER REALLOCATION BETWEEN SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN 
ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW PRINCIPLES 
This section gives an outlook on water allocation between Sudan and 
South Sudan under the principles of customary international fresh water 
law.275 Customary international water law does not endeavor to forecast the 
outcome of such negotiations,276 but plays an important role in framing the 
relevant procedural and legal considerations for such negotiations.277 This 
section further focuses on actual apportionment between the two Sudans for 
the last few years, Sudan’s actual water use, and South Sudan’s water con-
servation potential. 
A. Principles of Customary International Water Law and  
the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
Sudan and South Sudan have to enter into negotiations on the alloca-
tion of their common share of 18.5 bcm vis-à-vis Egypt, as established by 
the 1959 Nile Agreement.278 The two Sudans were reluctant to agree on 
binding allocations in the CPA because this topic had the potential to undo 
the entire peace agreement. 279 The negotiations for a binding agreement 
could help to overcome further unresolved disputes and foster understand-
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ing. This section outlines customary international water law and discusses 
the doctrines of equitable use and no significant harm, the decision of the 
ICJ in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project,280 and the thoughts of scholars281 of 
international fresh water law. 
Neither state is party to the two predominant international agreements 
on transboundary watercourses: the United Nations (UN) Economic Com-
mission for Europe’s (UNECE) Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes of 1992 (UNECE Wa-
ter Convention),282 which entered into force in 1996 and turned into a uni-
versally available legal framework for transboundary water cooperation 
following the entry into force of amendments in February 2013 that opened 
the agreement to all UN member states;283 and the UN Convention on the 
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses of 1997 
(UN Water Convention),284 which entered into force in August 2014. Be-
cause neither state is a party to these agreements, the governing principles 
for an agreement between the two Sudans ought to derive from customary 
international law. 
The UN Water Convention and UNECE Water Convention both have 
enshrined the main principles of customary international water law to “pro-
vide a framework for negotiating regional or site-specific agreements.”285 
Customary international law developed, like any customary rule, through a 
sequence of claims and counterclaims between two states or a group of 
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states until an agreement was reached.286 Three main principles have devel-
oped over time, represented in varying degrees in the UN and UNECE Wa-
ter Conventions.287 
First, the principle of equitable and reasonable use, also referred to as 
the principle of limited territorial sovereignty over national waters, limits 
the rights of riparian states and obliges consideration of the needs of their 
neighbors.288 “Equity” in its common law sense means “fairness consider-
ing the water needs of the several riparians and their ability to use the water 
efficiently.”289 The principle developed from the dialectic process of states 
claiming absolute control over national waters (absolute territorial sover-
eignty) and the counterclaim of requiring that waters flowing over a border 
cannot be altered with regard to quantity or quality other than what would 
naturally occur (absolute territorial integrity).290 
The second principle is the prohibition of significant transboundary 
harm, which is an inherent part of international environmental law. The 
principle derives from a Roman law principle prohibiting the use of proper-
ty in a manner that injures someone else’s property.291 The most prominent 
case supporting the no significant harm principle is the Trail Smelter arbi-
tration.292 The case between the United States and Canada involved trans-
boundary air pollution and can be applied to international watercourses.293 
The arbitration found: 
[U]nder the principles of international law, as well as of the law 
of the United States, no State has the right to use or permit the use 
of its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or 
to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, 
when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is estab-
lished by clear and convincing evidence.294  
The ICJ stated in the Corfu Channel Case that it is a principle of cus-
tomary international law that it is “every State’s obligation not to allow 
knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other 
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States.”295 The last rule of customary international water law is the principle 
of notification and information exchange,296 which includes the obligation 
to settle disputes peacefully.297 
Sudan and South Sudan must take those principles, which are accepted 
as customary international law,298 into account for the negotiation of their 
agreement. The application of these principles, however, remains particular-
ly vague and does not contribute greatly to the resolution of specific negoti-
ations.299 The UN Water Convention incorporates the principle of equitable 
and reasonable use in Article 5, the principle of no significant harm in Arti-
cle 7, and the principle to notify in Articles 12 and 13.300 Upstream South 
Sudan would invoke the principle of equitable and reasonable use of the 
Nile waters, whereas Sudan would emphasize the opposing principle of no 
significant harm.301 Two basic questions remain: How much water could 
South Sudan use according to the equitable and reasonable use principle, and 
when would South Sudan’s water consumption qualify as a “significant 
harm” to Sudan?302 
The dichotomy of the principles of equitable and reasonable use and 
no significant harm need to be brought into accord. It is still difficult to de-
termine with certainty how international law has harmonized the inherent 
tensions between downstream and upstream riparian states.303 The UN Wa-
ter Convention does not pronounce a preference between the principles and 
treats them as complementary.304 Given the purpose of the UN Water Con-
vention as a framework agreement for international watercourse agree-
ments, the explanation for that ambiguity could be the effort to strike a bal-
ance between equitable use and no significant harm on a case-by-case basis, 
as every international river is different.305 On the other hand, this remaining 
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uncertainty could be one reason for states’ hesitance to ratify the UN Water 
Convention, which explains why it took the Convention seventeen years to 
enter into force. 306 
In some cases, however, these contrary positions cannot be reconciled 
due to disputes over water allocations.307 The ICJ concluded in such cases 
that the principle of equitable use has primacy over the no significant harm 
principle. 308  In Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, the ICJ emphasized the 
“general obligation to ‘respect the environment of other States,’” but it did 
not refer to the no-harm rule, as argued by Hungary, in the context of the 
allocation of the shared water resources of the Danube River.309 Instead, the 
ICJ stressed the importance of the equitable utilization principle and made it 
the governing principle.310 Accordingly, it referred to a decision of the Per-
manent Court of International Justice that reinforced that: 
[The] community of interest in a navigable river becomes the ba-
sis of a common legal right, the essential features of which are the 
perfect equality of all riparian States in the use[] of the whole 
course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privilege 
of any one riparian State in relation to the others.311 
The ICJ referred to the UN Water Convention, which has strengthened this 
equitable utilization principle for non-navigational use.312 The theory of the 
community of interest,313 which the ICJ cited, emphasizes “the shared na-
ture of interests in an international watercourse” and the need to cooperate 
with the riparian states in its use and development.314 No riparian state may 
“unilaterally assum[e] control of a shared resource, and thereby deprive 
[other riparian states of their] right to an equitable and reasonable share of 
the natural resources.”315 
Similarly, with respect to state practice, Professor Stephen McCaffrey 
concludes that cases of strictly opposing positions of equitable use run 
                                                                                                                           
 306 See DINAR, supra note 276, at 42. 
 307 See Stoa, United Nations Watercourses Convention, supra note 285, at 1351. 
 308 See Stoa, International Water Law Principles and Frameworks, supra note 71, at 585. 
 309 MCCAFFREY, supra note 4, at 422 (quoting Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. 
Rep. 7,  para. 53). 
 310 Id. at 422; see Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, paras. 53, 78, 85, 147, 
150. 
 311 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, para. 85 (quoting Territorial Jurisdiction 
of International Commission of River Order, Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 23, at 27 (Sept. 
10)).  
 312 See id.; LEB, supra note 262, at 52. 
 313 See LEB, supra note 262, at 52–56. 
 314 MCCAFFREY, supra note 4, at 217; see Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, 
para. 85. 
 315 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, para. 85. 
36 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 39:1 
counter to the no-harm principle.316 Therefore, it depends on the circum-
stances if significant harm occurs to the downstream state and if the severity 
of harm might change over time.317 It is not that causing significant harm 
per se is prohibited, but that the unreasonable causing of such harm is pro-
hibited.318 This means that conduct of a state has to be tolerated, even if 
significant harm occurs, as long as the circumstances for its use are reason-
able.319 As McCaffrey explains, “[S]ignificant harm may have to be tolerat-
ed in order to achieve an overall regime of equitable and reasonable utiliza-
tion. . . .There is therefore no need to ‘reconcile’ the no-harm and equitable 
utilization principles. They are, in reality, two sides of the same coin.”320 
The upstream state must therefore perform due diligence to control for 
reasonable use. Nevertheless, the standard depends upon the circumstances 
of “what could reasonably be expected of the state” and which “applicable 
standards [] have been generally accepted” between the states, in the region, 
or globally.321 The determination of the threshold of significant harm is two-
fold. First, the complaining state has to declare “whether and to what extent 
harm has occurred.”322 Then, it has to be determined whether the upstream 
state “exercised due diligence to prevent the harm.”323 
Customary international water law is indeed very flawed when it 
comes to the interplay of no harm and equitable and reasonable use as guid-
ing principles for a water agreement, especially because every basin and its 
riparian states are unique. 324 Still, an agreement between the two states 
needs to take these principles into consideration.325 The key to an equitable 
agreement offers the principle of peaceful conflict resolution and notifica-
tion about water projects, which could have the effect of significant harm.326 
A future agreement, however, needs to take into account bilateral state prac-
tice between the two Sudans.327 
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B. Reallocation According to Existing Regional Practice and  
Regional Developments 
An agreement on water allocation based on the principle of equitable 
use needs to consider regional practice and other circumstances between 
Sudan and South Sudan.328 More specifically, the negotiations need to in-
clude aspects of existing and expected future water uses of the two states 
within the 18.5 bcm of allocated water.329 
The most important practice between the two states is Sudan’s inability 
to capture enough flow to use its entire share of the 18.5 bcm of water.330 
Even before the separation of the two states, the annual amount of Sudan’s 
“unused” water was 6 bcm—almost one-third of its total water allocation.331 
Sudan’s unused share of water could be fully allocated to South Sudan. As a 
result, the two states would still remain within the amount of the total allo-
cation under the 1959 Nile Agreement. 
But there are further constraints that need to be taken into considera-
tion to provide for equitable water allocation.332 Sudan has lost more than 
50% of its oil sources to South Sudan, and, therefore, it wants to compen-
sate its losses by using more of its irrigable lands for agriculture; it was 
once called the breadbasket of the Arab world.333 This economic develop-
ment requires a higher share of its unused water. Moreover, South Sudan is 
blessed with seasonal rainfall, which makes it less dependent upon the Nile 
River, whereas the Nile River is the only reliable water source for Sudan.334 
In addition, Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia have come to an agreement on 
the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which will be constructed 
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on the Blue Nile, directly on the Ethiopian side of the border with Sudan.335 
The dam, which is currently under construction, will create a huge water 
reservoir and generate electricity.336 The reservoir will change the flow pat-
tern of the Blue Nile, which contributes more than 80% of the Nile waters 
for Sudan and Egypt, from a highly seasonal resource to a constant resource 
in the long term.337 Moreover, it would provide Sudan with a much-needed 
water-capture facility for its water use.338 GERD could make Sudan less 
dependent upon the waters of the White Nile flowing from South Sudan. 
Equally important is South Sudan’s enormous potential for water con-
servation, which could minimize drastic evaporation losses. Water conser-
vation projects in the Al-Sudd, like the Jonglei Canal, would increase the 
flow of the White Nile by 100%.339 South Sudan could revive water conser-
vation projects in an environmentally sound manner to protect the unique 
swamp ecosystem. 340 The advantage of such an approach would be that 
South Sudan could invoke the provision of the 1959 Nile Agreement to 
share the costs and the water surplus generated from the project with Sudan 
and Egypt because of South Sudan’s inherited territorial right.341 Such a 
project would add a lot of value to the negotiations, as Sudan and Egypt 
were eager to construct such a project even before the 1959 Nile Agree-
ment.342 
To conclude, the current usage of Sudan, the GERD project, and South 
Sudan’s potential for a water conservation project are the most important 
factors in determining reasonable and equitable utilization between the two 
Sudans. The GERD will provide for a constant flow of water from the Blue 
Nile to satisfy Sudan’s agricultural needs, and prospective water projects in 
South Sudan could increase the constant flow of the White Nile.343 Thus, 
this would raise the overall water allocations under 1959 Nile Agreement 
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for all three states.344 Under these conditions, the two Sudans could agree 
on 12.5 bcm of water for Sudan (corresponding to its full current factual 
usage) and 6 bcm for South Sudan, without causing significant harm to Su-
dan. The requirements set out by the ICJ for a sustainable agreement on eq-
uitable utilization of a shared resource would be met if the two states could 
agree on constant consultation and adaptation measures to prevent future 
constraints and to ensure that no riparian state takes unilateral control that 
deprives the other state of its rights.345 Moreover, South Sudan needs to per-
form regular due diligence according to consented standards between the 
two states to control for a reasonable use of its waters and to prevent signif-
icant harm to Sudan.346 
VII. THE WAY FORWARD: SOUTH SUDAN AND THE COOPERATIVE 
FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT 
This final section presents an overview of the CFA and reflects on the 
contentious treaty negotiations between upstream and downstream riparian 
states.347 Finally, it evaluates the potential benefits for South Sudan and the 
Nile riparian states of the ratification of the agreement. 
The CFA is still not in force—it needs six ratifications or accessions.348 
So far, out of the six signatories (Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Kenya, and Burundi), only Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Tanzania have ratified 
the agreement.349 The CFA is widely recognized as a successful assertion of 
the water rights of the upstream riparian states and represents a rejection of 
the status quo of Egypt and Sudan claiming all waters of the Nile from the 
sources of the Nile as their own.350 The CFA was born out of the Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI), which was founded in 1999 by all Nile riparian states.351 
The NBI’s objectives are to reduce tensions, provide a framework for an 
agreement on equitable sharing and cooperative development of the Nile 
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Basin countries, and promote international discourse on Nile water is-
sues. 352 In May 2010, after a long phase of negotiations, four upstream 
states signed the CFA in Entebbe, Uganda.353 The CFA intends to establish a 
framework to “promote integrated management, sustainable development, 
and harmonious utilization of the water resources of the Basin, as well as 
their conservation and protection for the benefit of present and future gen-
erations,” rather than explicitly quantify equitable rights or water use allo-
cations for all riparian states.354 
The treaty reflects the modern principles of international water law355 
and incorporates the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization in Ar-
ticle 4—exactly the same provision as in the UN Water Convention.356 Arti-
cle 5 incorporates the principle of no significant harm and provides for 
compensation if any provision is violated.357 Article 14 of the CFA intro-
duces a unique concept of “water security,” intending to harmonize Article 
4 and Article 5 and foster cooperation between the states to reach the goal 
of basin-wide water security.358 This term is defined in Article 2(f) as “the 
right of all Nile Basin States to reliable access to and use of the Nile River 
system for health, agriculture, livelihoods, production[,] and environ-
ment.”359 The creation of a third legal principle of water security, however, 
might not resolve the issue between upstream and downstream states, which 
unsuccessfully pushed for Article 14(b) “not to significantly affect the water 
security of any other Nile Basin State.”360 The concept of water security is 
rendered useless as this principle turns out to be a more or less redundant 
reiteration of the equitable use principle and the prevention of causing sig-
nificant harm.361 The principle of equitable use, thus, outweighs the princi-
ple of no significant harm, as supported by the ICJ’s decision in Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros Project.362 The treaty is therefore favorable for the African up-
                                                                                                                           
 352 See CFA, supra note 348, art. 3. 
 353 See Cooperative Framework Agreement for the River Nile Basin: An Overview, supra note 
349. 
 354 See CFA, supra note 348, pmbl.. 
 355 See WEISS, supra note 280, at 102; McKenzie, supra note 17, at 596–97. 
 356 See CFA, supra note 348, art. 4; UN Water Convention, supra note 284, arts. 5, 6.  
 357 CFA, supra note 348, art. 5. 
 358 Id. art. 14; see WEISS, supra note 280, at 157–58; Stoa, International Water Law Princi-
ples and Frameworks, supra note 71, at 589. 
 359 CFA, supra note 348, art. 2(f). 
 360  Abseno, supra note 20, at 149; see Stoa, International Water Law Principles and 
Frameworks, supra note 71, at 589. 
 361 See Dereje Zeleke Mekonnen, Between the Scylla of Water Security and Charybdis of 
Benefit Sharing: The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement—Failed or Just Teetering on 
the Brink?, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 345, 362 (2011). 
 362 See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. Rep. 7, para. 85  
(Sept. 25); Salman, A Peacefully Unfolding African Spring?, supra note 1, at 21. 
2016] South Sudan’s Water Rights 41 
stream states, which claim an equitable and reasonable share of the Nile 
waters flowing through their territories for economic development.363 
The negotiation history regarding the principle of water security is on-
ly one example of the different expectations and objectives held by Egypt 
and Sudan as opposed to the other upper riparian states.364 In the negotia-
tions for the CFA, Sudan and especially Egypt pushed for three major con-
cerns.365 First, Egypt and Sudan insisted throughout the process of negotia-
tions on the incorporation of a clause to safeguard their existing rights and 
water allocations—a claim tantamount to a demand for recognition of 
Egypt’s colonial treaties and the 1959 Nile Agreement—that would essen-
tially reassure Egypt’s unilateral veto power on all water projects on the 
Nile.366 This position was vehemently opposed and rejected by the other 
riparian states.367 Second, the two states demanded that the no significant 
harm principle be the guiding principle in order to reinforce their claim on 
the entire flow of the Nile.368 Such an approach undermined the common 
goal of the NBI for socio-economic development through equitable utiliza-
tion of the Nile Basin water, to which Sudan and Egypt committed them-
selves.369 Finally, Egypt opposed the majority voting regime for amend-
ments to the CFA and the lack of notification rules.370 The upstream states 
have asserted their position that amendments to the CFA are permissible by 
two-thirds majority vote to avoid deceleration of the process by vetoes of 
single states. 371  Moreover, Ethiopia was concerned that notification re-
quirements for any water projects could be construed as recognition of co-
lonial-era treaties.372 As a result, Egypt and Sudan continue to oppose the 
CFA as a wrongful attack on their inherited rights, whereas the upstream 
states prefer that the CFA enter into force to stress their rights for socio-
economic development and equitable use of the Nile waters.373 
The upstream states expect South Sudan to accede to the CFA based on 
ethnic, historical, geographic, and cultural interests and the positive signals 
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that South Sudan has made over the last few years.374 South Sudan’s Minis-
ter of Irrigation and Water Resources, Paul Mayom Akec, stated that South 
Sudan’s ratification of the CFA is “inevitable.”375 He added in June 2013 
that “the process of joining the agreement has started at all levels of the 
state apparatus in South Sudan.”376 The accession process to the CFA, how-
ever, came to a halt because of a lack of political will and power due to the 
eruption of a brutal civil war and a split in the South Sudanese govern-
ment.377 
When South Sudan’s water rights are back on its political agenda, it 
has to consider its future role in the region. According to the status quo, it is 
legally permissible for South Sudan to accede to the CFA. South Sudan is 
bound by the fixed water allocations and by the realization of water conser-
vation projects in the Al-Sudd swamps established by the 1959 Nile Agree-
ment, but it is free to accede to the CFA within its share, which it has to ne-
gotiate with Sudan under the 1959 Nile Agreement.378 So long as South Su-
dan remains within its share of the 1959 Nile Agreement, it remains com-
pliant with its inherited rights and obligations. In addition, the main re-
quirement of the CFA for equitable use could be maintained simultaneously. 
If South Sudan wants to accede to the CFA, however, it needs to be clear 
and unambiguous about its objectives towards Sudan and Egypt, which 
means that South Sudan should not officially request to be bound by the 
entire 1959 Nile Agreement379 because the stipulated full water claims are 
hardly compatible with the CFA’s approach, as constituted in the preamble 
of the CFA.380 
The accession of South Sudan could further motivate states to ratify or 
accede to the CFA so that it finally receives the number of ratifications 
needed to enter into force. Ideally, the accession could ease tensions be-
tween the upstream and downstream states, as South Sudan would serve as 
a kind of binding link. After all, South Sudan is obligated by the territorial 
rights and obligations that favor downstream Sudan and Egypt, but is 
viewed favorably by the upper riparian states due to its willingness to ac-
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cede to the CFA.381 South Sudan could therefore stipulate an approach of 
the two very different conceptions on the rights to the Nile waters. 
There are also positive signals for such an approach, as Egypt and Su-
dan have recently shown they are able to change their position on their in-
herited rights on all Nile waters when under pressure. 382 On March 23, 
2015, Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia entered into an agreement on the GERD 
project in Ethiopia that significantly impacts the amount of water arriving at 
the Aswan Dam.383 It is the first time that Egypt and Sudan agreed on a 
large-scale water project on the Nile.384 Given the major disputes between 
Egypt and Ethiopia, which peaked when Egypt explicitly threatened to 
bomb the dam,385 this agreement is very astonishing and could mark a turn-
around in the downstream position. It remains to be seen, however, if Egypt 
and Sudan will adopt a more inclusive approach towards the water rights of 
the upper riparian states. 
The CFA would be advantageous for South Sudan. It supports the 
struggle of the upstream states for equal rights and establishes mechanisms 
that protect South Sudan’s share of the Nile. Most of the states are currently 
only constructing small water projects that have hardly any effect on the 
water flow for South Sudan.386 Moreover, the Al-Sudd swamp serves as a 
natural water regulator guaranteeing a constant flow of the White Nile from 
South Sudan to Sudan and Egypt.387 In addition, the CFA provides many 
legal mechanisms for cooperation between the parties to the CFA to control 
for South Sudan’s sufficient water supplies. 388  Although the 1959 Nile 
Agreement enforces Egypt’s and Sudan’s claimed rights on the Nile River’s 
entire flow by threatening to resort to military force against the riparian 
states, as opposed to the 1959 Nile Agreement, the CFA provides legally 
binding, safe, and peaceful conflict resolution mechanisms.389 
Finally, the CFA would establish the first international environmental 
protection standards for the entire Nile River Basin.390 Article 6 of the CFA 
is dedicated to the protection of the Nile River’s ecosystems and foresees 
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special protection for wetland areas.391 Article 9 introduces comprehensive 
environmental impact assessment standards for water projects.392 These en-
vironmental protection standards could be very useful for South Sudan, 
which might sooner or later construct a water conservation project to limit 
evaporation and enhance the overall flow in the Al-Sudd swamps. By adopt-
ing these standards, South Sudan can be assured that a project like the 
Jonglei Canal will not be constructed without taking environmental and so-
cio-economic impacts of the local population into consideration. South Su-
dan could hold these binding rules of the CFA against Sudan and Egypt, 
which might demand water conservation projects in the Al-Sudd area ac-
cording to the territorial rights and obligations established by the 1959 Nile 
Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
The newly independent South Sudan falls directly in the demarcation 
zone of the rivalry between downstream and upstream riparian states along 
the Nile River. This tension stems from Egypt and Sudan stressing their 
rights to the entire flow of the Nile. The upstream African states, however, 
refuse to be bound by colonial treaties and claim their equitable share of the 
Nile River. South Sudan will play an important role in the future of the Nile 
River Basin region, whichever way it chooses to proceed. South Sudan may 
choose to cooperate more closely with Sudan and Egypt under the 1959 
Nile Agreement, or it may decide to accede to the CFA treaty to support the 
upstream riparian states in their struggle for acknowledgement of their wa-
ter rights. 
The analysis of the law of state succession evaluated the legal status 
quo of South Sudan’s water rights. The concept of automatic state succes-
sion, according to Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, is not applica-
ble to South Sudan because this provision has not become part of customary 
international law. South Sudan, therefore, did not become party to the entire 
1959 Nile Agreement. In fact, in the case of state separation, customary in-
ternational law provides for pragmatic solutions for all states and grants 
South Sudan the sole right to notify Sudan and Egypt of its willingness to 
become party to the agreement and then for the two states to finally decide 
on South Sudan’s accession. 
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However, the application of Article 12 of the 1978 Vienna Convention, 
which resembles customary international law, points to a different result. 
This Article concludes that South Sudan, since its independence, was auto-
matically bound by the territorial rights and obligations established by the 
1959 Nile Agreement. In particular, South Sudan enjoys the right to an equi-
table share of the 18.5 bcm of water allocated to Sudan. Moreover, it may 
undertake water conservation projects in the Al-Sudd swamps to raise the 
overall water apportionments of South Sudan, Sudan, and Egypt. Finally, it 
may become party to the Joint Technical Commission with regard to the 
execution of territorial rights. 
With respect to the finding above, South Sudan should enter into nego-
tiations with Sudan for an apportionment of its share of 18.5 bcm of water 
according to international water law because the 1959 Nile Agreement re-
mains silent in this regard. Such a bilateral agreement between the two Su-
dans is a prerequisite for whichever route South Sudan chooses. If South 
Sudan wishes to become a full party to the 1959 Nile Agreement, it needs a 
clear definition of its existing rights and obligations; if it considers acceding 
to the CFA, it needs to be sure to comply with its territorial rights and obli-
gations under the 1959 Nile Agreement towards Sudan and Egypt. Such an 
agreement should take into consideration the annual water usage of Sudan, 
which amounted to only 12.5 bcm of water even before the secession, and 
its socio-economic development. Overall, Sudan’s unused 6 bcm of water 
could be assigned to South Sudan without leading to significant harm to 
Sudan. Moreover, South Sudan has great water conservation potential in the 
Al-Sudd swamps, which would allow for an increased flow of the White 
Nile to Sudan and Egypt. 
Given the legal status quo, this Article finally argues that South Sudan 
should accede to the CFA. South Sudan may accede to the CFA without vio-
lating its territorial rights and obligations under the 1959 Nile Agreement, 
as long it is does not exceed its water allotment with Sudan, which it must 
negotiate prior to accession. South Sudan most likely would agree to an in-
ternational water treaty that corresponds with international water law and 
guarantees an equitable use for all riparian states in the long term. The ac-
cession of South Sudan to the CFA could also provide several advantages 
for the entire Nile River Basin: it could foster further ratifications and lead 
to the CFA’s entry into force; it might also help overcome the decade-long 
dispute between Egypt and Sudan and the remaining eight East African up-
stream states. 
Rest assured, whichever road South Sudan chooses for its future, it 
will have a major impact on the highly complicated hydro-politics of the 
Nile River Basin. 
   
 
